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I. Introduction
The year 2011 marked the “return” of US high-level strategic attention to 
East Asia after a decade of war in the Middle East and Central Asia sparked 
by 9/11. This “pivot toward Asia” was expressed in policy terms by the US 
stating formally in 2010 that freedom of navigation in the South China Sea was 
a national interest. Then in 2011, the US joined the East Asian Summit (EAS), 
signed a defense cooperation agreement with Australia that stations US Marines 
at Darwin, and re-launched the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade initiative at the 
APEC summit in Hawaii. In diplomatic terms, 2011 saw the APEC summit 
in Hawaii, visits to the region by President Obama, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, and Secretaries of Defense Robert Gates and Leon Panetta, and a step 
up in US military cooperation with countries in the region. 
What gives this US activity meaning is the growing perception not only in 
the US, but also in East Asia, that China’s growing confidence in its strength 
(and its expectation of Western decline) is making it both more expansionist 
and belligerent at the expense of its neighbors. Aside from a rapid build up of 
its navy, including sea trials of a new aircraft carrier in 2011, Chinese behaviors 
that created this perception include a new characterization of the South China 
Sea as a “core interest” (hexin liyi), the ramming of a Japanese coast guard 
vessel by a Chinese fishing trawler in 2010 followed by Chinese demands for 
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6a Japanese apology and an abrupt cut off of rare earth exports to Japan, brawls 
between South Korean coast guard sailors and Chinese fishermen in 2010 
and 2011 that led to the loss of life on both sides, incarceration of Vietnamese 
fishermen starting in 2009 and in June 2011 the deliberate cutting of cables 
deployed by a Vietnamese research vessel, threats of punishment issued to the 
Philippines if it persisted in its South China Sea territorial claims and desire to 
upgrade defense cooperation with the US, interference with US naval vessels 
collecting intelligence in the South China Sea, and China’s refusal in 2010-2011 
to discuss South China Sea conflicts multilaterally with ASEAN, which violated 
a commitment China made in the Declaration on Conduct (DOC) in the South 
China Sea that it signed with ASEAN in 2002. 
China’s attitude seems to be that its rise is inevitable (which may be 
true) and that, in view of its growing military and economic leverage, its 
neighbors have no choice but to accommodate China’s demands (which may 
not be true). If this way of thinking is in fact the case, it would suggest that 
China’s commitment to multilateralism has been tactical rather than strategic, 
i.e., multilateralism was embraced when China had weak influence and low 
coercive capacity, but with higher coercive capacity it is more assertive and less 
willing to bind itself to multilateral processes. However, China may stick with 
multilateralism when it leads to outcomes that serve its interests.(1)  
 These Chinese attitudes and behaviors emerged in 2009 and they have been 
jarringly inconsistent with China’s rhetoric of a peaceful rise and a “new security 
concept” that accompanied China’s charm offensive in Southeast Asia from 
2000-2008.(2) During that period, China signed, among other things, the DOC 
in 2002, the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement in 2002, ASEAN’s Treaty 
of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in 2003, the China-ASEAN Joint Declaration 
on Strategic Partnership for Peace and Prosperity in 2003, and it signed 
ASEAN’s declaration on a Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) 
in Southeast Asia in 2004. However, ASEAN concern regarding China’s new 
unilateral assertiveness became so great that in 2011 —from Myanmar to the 
Philippines —ASEAN members exercised choice and welcomed a greater US 
ICU75通し.indb   6 13/02/26   17:44
7East Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads
regional strategic presence when President Barak Obama attended the East 
Asian Summit where the South China Sea situation was the top discussion item. 
II. Regional Security Tensions Undermining East Asian Regionalism
This sea change in the region can hardly be blamed on the US. It originated 
in Chinese behavior toward its neighbors along its East Asian borders from 
South Korea down to Myanmar. But China’s faux pas has been a diplomatic 
windfall for the US, which the US quickly and happily exploited because it 
shifted Sino-US competition for influence in East Asia from an economic to a 
politico-military dimension, where China is weakest (relative to the US and its 
allies). It is on this terrain that the divisive logic of the balance of power could 
begin to outweigh the integrative logic of comparative advantage to redirect the 
course of regionalism in East Asia. 
1. Comparative Advantage vs. The Balance of Power in East Asia
Like NAFTA and the EU, East Asia relies on the logic of comparative 
advantage to build regionalism. But the crucial difference is that East Asia has 
always been divided by the balance of power. Unlike North America or Europe, 
East Asia is not a security community (where members will not resort to force to 
settle their differences). This goes a long way toward explaining the shallowness 
of regional institution building. 
The balance of power describes a conflict-prone competition between 
sovereign, armed, and insecure states. Realists claim this is an eternal truth in 
international relations, though it may not be a necessary condition according to 
interdependence theorists,(3) democratic peace theorists,(4) and constructivists.(5) 
Regardless, the balance of power is part of the reality today in East Asian 
relations. There is no binding agreement among states to remain at peace, and 
there are unresolved conflicts that have led, and could still lead to, the use of 
force. 
In the balance of power, relative power is the critical metric because the 
stronger impose their will on the weaker. The effort to be stronger than others, if 
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8generalized, creates competitive rivalry and the security dilemma whereby the 
effort of each to be stronger than one’s neighbor elicits that neighbor’s fear and 
redoubled effort to strengthen arms. Paradoxically, this dynamic produces arms 
races and less security for each and all. In game theoretic terms, the competition 
becomes a zero-sum game (where the marginal gain of one is matched by a 
marginal loss of another) or a negative-sum game (where interaction leads both 
sides to lose —but whoever loses less “wins” because they have gained power 
in relative terms).(6)  
Where the balance of power determines behavior, trade will remain 
limited between competing powers. As Kenneth Waltz and Joseph Grieco 
explain, the danger of becoming vulnerable to trade sanctions (vulnerability 
interdependence),(7) and fear that trade will benefit an adversary more than you,(8) 
will severely limit the prospects for cooperation and interdependence. Hence, 
this fundamentally divisive logic cannot provide the basis for robust regionalism. 
The integrative logic of comparative advantage liberated from the 
constraints of the balance of power can support a flourishing regionalism. 
According to the economic concept of comparative advantage, factors of 
production are distributed unevenly among states. One is led by economic self 
interest to trade goods one is better at producing (given one’s factor endowment) 
in exchange for goods produced by other countries within trading distance 
that are scarce because one has a harder time making them (due to one’s factor 
endowment). Simple trade of this type produces an immediate gain in welfare 
because you export an abundant good and import a scarce good. 
Once established, trade leads actors to specialize in production for export, 
which increases efficiency and develops an international division of labor (i.e., 
interdependence). With access to a larger international market, new economies 
of scale and further opportunities for specialization and growth can be exploited. 
Thus, in game theoretic terms voluntary trade is a positive sum game (where all 
parties gain from interaction).
Robert Keohane has explained how, even in a realist world, this integrative 
logic can lead to institutionalized governance in international relations. Providing 
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that the gains of cooperation outweigh the costs of organizing and sustaining 
it, and so long as actors do not view others as security threats, arrangements to 
cooperate and share the resulting gains can become institutionalized features of 
international order.(9)  
Since the end of WW II, the strategic and economic predominance of the US 
in East Asia deterred great power war and introduced general stability. But Cold 
War bipolarity divided the region and even individual nations (China, Korea, and 
Vietnam). There were “limited wars” in Korea and Vietnam, and US strategic 
predominance merely kept a lid on intra-East Asian rivalries and conflicts; it did 
not resolve them.
Nevertheless, East Asian states willing to live within the US security order 
were able to freely develop the integrative logic of comparative advantage. They 
were able to rely on exports to rich western markets despite the trade friction that 
East Asian mercantilism produced.(10) China under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership 
aligned with this hegemonic system and prospered, and today the only East 
Asian country still excluded is North Korea. Thus, stable American hegemony 
has allowed trade to freely develop both within the region and between East 
Asia and western markets. 
When economic partners neither threaten each other nor object to the 
prevailing security order, cooperation that produces unevenly distributed gains 
is not a critical problem. But if a partner becomes a potential threat to one’s vital 
interests, then the divisive logic of the balance of power becomes paramount. 
Logic dictates that, if one has choice, one will not cooperate with potential 
enemies leaving them with greater power or leverage over oneself. If or when 
the balance of power logic takes over, weaker states will want to, or be forced to, 
bandwagon (i.e., become subordinate allies) with strong states. And adversaries 
will want to limit trade and cooperation with each other, thus polarizing the 
region. This could slow East Asian regionalism, or even end it in its present 
form. 
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2. Western Models of Regionalism
Regionalism refers to the political construction of institutionalized 
cooperation by agents in states within a shared geographic space to achieve 
shared interests, e.g., enhanced prosperity and/or security. But there is no single 
model or formula for this process.(11) The geographic scope of regionalism is 
determined by the interplay of physical geography, contingent functional factors 
(e.g., economic relations), and subjective factors (e.g., commonalities and 
differences rooted in historical experience, religion, language, or institutions). 
The institutionalization of regionalism may be formal or informal, and the issue 
focus may vary (e.g., trade, security, or environment). 
East Asian regionalism has always straddled the competing logics of the 
balance of power and comparative advantage. In addition, it has a radically 
different economic and political developmental trajectory from that of the West. 
And its geography is more far-flung and diverse. For these reasons, regionalism 
that developed in the advanced west has only limited utility for understanding 
the kind of regionalism we see in East Asia. The deviation of the Asian model 
from Western models may be viewed as a failure by those who believe that the 
EU or NAFTA provide models that should be copied by others. But East Asian 
regionalism is better viewed in its own right as a success against long odds. Let 
us first briefly review the western models before turning to the features of the 
East Asian model.
(1) Western Economic Models of Regionalism
The basic economic models of regionalism are provided by NAFTA (a 
free trade agreement) and the EU (which began as a customs union). Both aim 
to develop comparative advantage and higher national welfare by promoting 
the integration of separate national markets first of all through regional 
trade liberalization. Both models subsequently moved to include investment 
liberalization, but NAFTA has not followed the EU in embracing labor mobility 
and political integration. In the NAFTA model, liberal democratic states adopt 
a legal framework for liberalization but retain their sovereign national identities 
ICU75通し.indb   10 13/02/26   17:44
11
East Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads
(i.e., individual tariff schedules and investment rules) toward third parties. The 
free market and liberal state are the key mechanisms and politically, things are 
managed through inter-governmental coordination and national legal regimes 
without supranational authority or political institutionalization. 
In the customs union model, states in pursuit of collective economic 
advantage agree to a common external tariff in addition to internal free 
trade.(12) This means economic community and pooled sovereignty, which 
leads to a supranational external identity and supranational institutional 
development. As a new supranational interest and identity forms, the logic 
of fiscal federalism took hold to drive the development of decentralized multi-
level governance. Fiscal federalism is the notion that societal collective 
interests naturally become differentiated at the local, provincial, national, and 
supranational regional (e.g., EU) levels. Centralized national governments 
cannot efficiently and effectively provide public goods and services to meet 
collective needs (ranging from street cleaning to pan-European money and 
defense systems) that form at these different levels. Therefore, one has to 
decentralize and delegate governance powers to political authorities located 
at these different levels to register and meet existing needs efficiently.(13) To do 
this, the EU has developed what has been called multi-level governance, which 
refers to an interdependent structure of supra national, national, regional, and 
local authorities joined in an interactive process of negotiation that allocate 
governance responsibilities among them.(14) The strength of Western Europe’s 
tradition of social democracy, with its emphasis on meeting social welfare needs 
through government, made multi-level governance the main path of institutional 
development for European regionalism. Supranational federal authority (e.g., the 
European Central Bank) is an aspect of the evolution of this larger governance 
structure. As this regional governance mechanism develops, new spatial 
variation and functional collective need may emerge that requires redefinition of 
governance actors and agendas.(15)
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(2) Western Political Models of Regionalism
There are three political models of regionalism that anchor western thinking 
about regionalism. Neo-functionalism follows the rationalist logic of economic 
self-interest to describe how functional cooperation in the EU widens and 
deepens as the experience of cooperation redefines the knowledge and interests 
of actors. Societal actors in different states see benefit in new cooperation (e.g., a 
bigger internal market), as do EU officials who have an organizational interest in 
starting new cooperation policies and structures. National officials are persuaded 
by political pressure and technical advice from experts to delegate authority 
upward “beyond the nation-state.” This new cooperation initiative may then “spill 
over” into adjacent functional areas as new problems and opportunities arise that 
can be addressed by further cooperation. The process repeats to drive a widening 
and deepening of cooperation.(16)
The other two models are rooted in the idea of political community, which 
is a matter of individual and collective identity. It points to loyalty, trust, and 
obligation in order to preserve one’s community.
Realism explains the creation and development of NAFTA and the EU 
in terms of inter-state bargaining. NAFTA is simply the US imposing its 
preferences on smaller, dependent neighboring economies. Germany and France, 
whose national interests in securing their own peace and prosperity are served 
by an economic alliance within a NATO security structure, drive the EU process. 
This pair then attracts surrounding smaller states seeking shelter and national 
benefit under a Franco-German condominium.(17)
Karl Deutsch made the first sustained theoretical attempt to apply the 
notion of political community to the development of the European and NATO 
regionalism. His concept of transactionalism was that integrating national 
systems of mass communication could lead to a redefinition of loyalties and 
political community from the nation-state level to a European or trans-Atlantic 
community.(18) This focus on identity formation and its redefinition through 
social transactions in order to get beyond nation-state rivalry has been revived 
and expressed in a different lexical format by constructivists today(19) and has 
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been applied to ASEAN.(20)
(3) The Western Idea of Regionalism
The primary policy goals are free trade and market integration. These 
goals are made possible by the more fundamental institutional and societal 
characteristics of the advanced west. In geopolitical terms, North America 
and the EU are not just a security community (i.e., conflicts of interest among 
members leading to war is not conceivable), but prior to economic regionalism 
the regions were already integrated into a security alliance led by the US (i.e., 
NATO). Because members were already military allies the gain of one was a 
gain for all, so the integrative logic of comparative advantage had free rein with 
little concern for relative gain.(21)
Moreover, in historical perspective, North America and Western Europe 
enjoy a mature stage of capitalism with financial, production, and consumer 
markets —as well as political, economic, and social elites —that have been 
intimately connected for at least a century. Free trade is an unquestioned shared 
norm because, sharing a position as early industrializers and international 
lenders at the developed core of a globalized economy, North America and 
Western Europe stand to gain the most from this policy. 
In institutional and societal terms, in the West business and financial 
interests dominate democratic systems and state institutions because they are 
well organized and well funded interest groups,(22) and their interests are in 
line with the advanced West’s comparative advantage, i.e., the West is capital 
abundant and benefits from exporting capital and capital intensive products.(23) 
With the welfare state redistributing part of net national gains from trade to 
domestic interests hurt by free trade, the post WW II liberalization agenda had 
a stable domestic political basis.(24) European and US corporations successfully 
pushed for market integration in their respective regions to benefit from the 
larger markets that would result, and governments complied.(25) Political 
legitimacy and the rule of law were well established. 
These convergent factors mean that political, economic, and social norms 
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that support regional market integration based on free trade have been ascendant 
for decades. The FTA and customs union models of regional integration have 
not threatened the vital interests of any veto-wielding political interests in the 
West, and they promote the interests of society’s most powerful pressure groups. 
With mature legal and bureaucratic institutions managing liberalization, Western 
regionalism yielded substantial and ongoing short-term gains for key domestic 
stakeholders to keep the process moving forward with relative efficiency. And 
with rising wealth and the welfare state prevalent in western countries, the 
resulting structural adjustments have not produced massive economic and social 
dislocations that could threaten systemic stability. 
However, none of this is true in East Asia. 
3. East Asian Regionalism
(1) Security
The foundation upon which western models of regionalism have been built 
does not exist in East Asia. In geopolitical terms East Asia could not be more 
different from the region encompassed by NATO. 
First, there is a strategic dividing line drawn though East Asia to the extent 
that US military allies and cooperation partners assist the US effort to maintain 
strategic dominance against those in the region who resist it. And US allies are 
not aligned with each other multilaterally as in NATO, but are isolated in dyadic 
alliances with the US (“hub and spokes alliance structure”) with no US need to 
resolve differences between the Asian allies.(26) 
Second, with respect to boundaries, there are unresolved national (re)
unification issues in the Korean peninsula and the Taiwan Strait. And there 
are territorial disputes in Northeast and Southeast Asia that affect almost all 
countries.(27) 
Third, security has a domestic component absent in the West. The 
Declaration of ASEAN Concord (1976) used the term “resilience” to mean 
security in a more holistic and comprehensive sense.(28) It represents the ability to 
manage the internal and external problems —both military and non-military —
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that ASEAN’s fragile post-colonial states faced during nation building.(29) 
Resilience was a term coined in Indonesia to explain why external and internal 
security and stability missions were equally important in army doctrine.(30) The 
internal and external dimensions have been linked because there are many cases 
where internal tensions and conflicts have the potential to draw in external actors 
to challenge state sovereignty.(31)
Finally, there are pre-existing historical and cultural animosities dividing 
states that interact with current domestic tensions, unresolved territorial disputes, 
and economic competition to make stability fragile. Thus, any talk of a regional 
security community as a present reality is premature, to say the least. 
(2) Security vs Trade
The dilemma of security versus trade is that East Asian countries need to 
pursue trade and investment expansion but commitment in this direction, if 
pursued too far, can threaten security. The security question is rooted in external 
and internal factors.
In external relations, the absence of a security community where the 
physical and economic security of each member is a shared concern means that 
each actor must limit its exposure to risks and costs associated with economic 
interdependence. For example, after China cut off exports of rare earth minerals 
of critical importance to Japan’s advanced industries in response to the arrest 
of a Chinese ship captain, will Japan want to deepen its reliance on China? In 
the absence of genuine trust and security in regional relations, how far can a 
state —even one as stable as Japan —prudently commit to regional economic 
interdependence? In this setting, regionalism has not, and cannot, replicate the 
deep and strongly governed interdependence in North America and Western 
Europe, which have long constituted a security community. In East Asia, the 
absence of trust, the real possibility of armed conflict among members, and deep 
unresolved animosities continue to limit cooperation.
Internally, most East Asian states are still in a fragile process of political 
and economic development. Sovereignty and non-interference are primary state 
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concerns. Nevertheless, stability and legitimacy depend on their ability to raise 
millions out of absolute poverty, and so they need to aggressively promote trade, 
though not exclusively through liberalization for reasons already discussed. 
These governments are like bicycle riders who need to peddle to keep from 
toppling over, but at the same time, they cannot pedal too fast and risk an 
accident. That is, they cannot risk experimenting with radical liberalization that 
may have profound and unforeseeable consequences for their political survival. 
These external and internal security constraints preclude the deep political 
compromises and commitments needed for member states to pool their 
sovereignty or to hand their fates over to the free rein to market forces as has 
occurred in Europe and North America. Therefore, rather than being flaws, the 
informality and shallowness of East Asian regionalism should be viewed as 
answers that enable the successful pursuit of deeper interdependence. These 
institutional arrangements have supported remarkable growth in trade and GDP 
and have maintained dialog and cooperation through unexpected contingencies 
in internal and external security conditions that could have broken more rigid 
and ambitious legal and bureaucratic structures. 
(3) East Asia in the Global Economy: Dependent Interdependence 
Intra-regional trade (non-oil) in East Asia (APT + Hong Kong + Taiwan) 
reached 52.1 percent in 2006/07,(32) which was higher than NAFTA (40 percent). 
This degree of interdependence invites APT efforts to manage it, but fears that 
these efforts could become exclusionary are unfounded.(33) Final exports to 
Japan, Europe, and the Americas were about 60 percent of developing Asia’s 
total exports last year.(34) 
Dependence on the West for growth has increased both regional 
interdependence and the need to manage it (through APT). A “trade-triangle” 
has formed as regional production networks oriented East Asian country exports 
to China to feed its factories, which in turn export mostly to western OECD 
countries. This deepened interdependence and APT stabilizes and allows the 
further development of regional production networks.(35)
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(4) Diversity
In historical and cultural perspective, the region is hugely different from 
the West where there is a shared Christian religious heritage, languages with 
a common root in Sanskrit, and a political civilization organized around 
democracy and the rule of law rooted in ancient Greece and Rome. With the 
exception of Japan, East Asia contains peoples with diverse ethnic identities, 
religions, and political traditions divided into territorial units by pre-modern 
empires or Western colonial powers with little regard for actual cultural 
geography. These territorial units were decolonized and/or experienced 
revolutions to produce modern states during turbulent, and often bloody, events 
only after WW II. Again, with the exception of Japan, industrial capitalism took 
root, if at all, only after WW II. National elites oriented toward the cultures of 
their former colonial masters have been strangers to each other until recently. 
With respect to geography, economy, and social development, there is 
perhaps the greatest diversity of any region on the planet. On the northern 
boundary is sub-arctic Siberia and the Russian Far East; on the south are 
equatorial regions in the southern hemisphere; on the eastern boundary are 
the Japanese, Philippine, and Indonesian archipelagos; and a continental land 
boundary with South and Central Asia is on the west. Through the middle of the 
region runs a division between poorer continental nations and more prosperous 
littoral and island nations. 
Annual per capita income in 2010 was $41,900 in Singapore and only 
$760 in Cambodia.(36) Inequality is not only extreme between countries, but also 
within countries. The income ratio of the highest 20% to the lowest 20% of the 
population in Malaysia was 11.3 (2009) and for China it was 8.3 (2005).(37)
(5) Developmental Need
China is at the heart of the region but it is still far from western levels of 
economic maturity. It had a per capita figure of $4260 in 2010 and it has an 
institutional legacy of a communist command economy still to resolve. 
Absolute poverty and the delivery of basic services are still predominant 
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issues in the region. In the two most populous East Asian countries, the 
population living on $2 or less a day was 36.3% in China (2005) and 50.6% 
in Indonesia (2009). In comparison, the percentage living in poverty in the US 
today is 12.7%. But this refers to a single person earning less than $10,890 a 
year that will receive state funded social welfare benefits. Thus, one may see 
why delivering strong sustained growth that alleviates poverty (which implies a 
strong role for the state) is a primary political aim. 
(6) Developmental States
With respect to the state in East Asia, due to its fragility and the general 
need to catch up to the West in economic and political development, its priority 
has been the goal of development rather than the process of liberal democracy. 
Chalmers Johnson gave the first detailed analysis of the critical relationship 
between rapid economic growth and the legitimacy of the state in East Asia 
and other scholars have elaborated the theme.(38) The key political traits of what 
might be called East Asian developmentalism have been: development before 
democracy; policy making by a professional bureaucracy insulated from civil 
society by a political elite; and the exclusion of independent critics, labor, and 
consumer interests in order to speed capital formation and growth. Ideologically, 
nationalism is used to unify disparate interests and justify state dominance over 
civil society. Reviewing East Asia’s record of development, Joseph Stiglitz and 
Dani Rodrick have noted that governments in East Asia had success in speeding 
capitalist development because they did not heed neoliberal orthodoxy, i.e., they 
did not implement a narrow deregulation and liberalization agenda.(39)
Political and developmental factors help to explain why. East Asian states 
are often ethnically divided and have arbitrarily drawn boundaries inherited 
from the recent colonial past. Governments may lack a credible ideological 
justification to rule. Those in power may not have genuine democratic 
popular consent to rule. Hence, liberal freedoms, democratic elections, and an 
independent judiciary with the rule of law can be scarce. These states achieve 
societal cohesion and political legitimacy through performance —putting more 
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food on the table for the people, creating more wealth for national elites, and 
generating more resources for the state. In most countries, business and financial 
classes have been subordinated to bureaucratic and political elites. They are 
unable to make their preferences into state policy because democratic norms 
and institutions, which limit the power of the state and favor agenda setting by 
organized interests in civil society, tend to be weaker than in the West. This does 
not mean, however, that states are unfriendly to business. States know they must 
use the market to get development, and so the key has been to bracket market 
activities with policies to spur growth while maintaining stability and legitimacy. 
(7) Policy Implications
Liberalization demanded by the West is not uppermost on the development 
agenda of developing countries. Today, developing countries can expect little 
benefit from further liberalization demanded by rich countries because the rich 
countries are already liberalized in these areas, and the narrow free trade agenda 
crowds out their own development priorities.(40)
Liberalization by developing countries can promote trade and growth, 
but so can other measures, e.g., more public investment in infrastructure, 
investment in human capital, better public administration, or trade facilitation 
(i.e., reducing existing information and transaction costs through things like 
streamlined visa and customs procedures or export promotion). In developing 
East Asia, infrastructure, human capital, and institutional assets that have long 
existed in the West, and are required to make liberalization work properly, are in 
short supply and become trade bottlenecks, and in some developing areas they 
still need to be created out of whole cloth. Without trade-associated measures 
in infrastructure, institutional, and human capital development, liberalization 
simply may not work in attracting new trade and investment. If improvements 
in trade-associated areas can make trade simpler and cheaper to carry out, trade 
will grow without new liberalization measures.
And liberalization, if heedlessly pursued without the proper infrastructure 
and institutional groundwork, may be costly to states. For example, when states 
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lack environmental management capacities, foreign investors may extract 
natural wealth leaving behind a wrecked ecosystem and little lasting benefit. 
And one need only recall that the Asian Financial Crisis, which has been blamed 
on reckless premature financial liberalization approved by the IMF,(41) resulted in 
political instability in Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia, and drastically lowered 
growth and welfare throughout the region with negative knock-on effects in 
Russia and Brazil. 
Nor is integration desired, if this means the loss of national sovereignty. The 
fragility of states, and their desire for consolidation, means that regionalism will 
be a state-driven and state-centric process, featuring cooperation rather than EY-
style federation or NAFTA-style homologation (i.e., adopting a homogeneous, 
seamless legal commercial and investment code binding all states). 
Many still use NAFTA and EU norms as the benchmark for success and 
criticize East Asian regionalism for clinging to state sovereignty and not making 
free trade a paramount concern. They fail to understand the many reasons 
why liberalization and sacrifices of sovereignty cannot be the sole focus at 
the region’s present stage of economic, social, and political development, and 
why it cannot be the sole measure of success.(42) In East Asia, success is not 
policy, but actual outcomes: trade growth and rising living standards under 
conditions of political stability in the region. The actual record in this regard is 
quite good given all the underlying obstacles to peace and development. As a 
region of developing countries, the East Asian process of regional integration 
described later is functionally broader than trade liberalization, more politically 
constrained, more diverse, and more state-centric than the NAFTA and EU 
models. But it is no less successful in its own terms. Before describing it, we 
need to understand why a great power does not lead it. 
4. The Failure of Big Powers to Lead
Leadership in institutionalizing cooperation requires someone to have 
superior power and resources, as well as the motivation and political ability to 
coordinate interests and broker deals within a group.(43) The problem in East Asia 
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is that the three potential leaders —the US, Japan, and China —have competing 
visions as indicated below. No one has been able to persuade the remaining two 
to yield, so conventional regional leadership has not emerged.
(1) The Failure of the US Vision in APEC
APEC is a summit meeting process that was created in 1989 and, as a 
lineal descendent of earlier initiatives such as the Pacific Free Trade and 
Development (PAFTAD), Pacific Basin Economic Community (PBEC), and 
Pacific Economic Cooperation Conference (PECC) meetings, it was intended 
to create a trans-pacific trading community. The US pushed to impose its vision 
of a legally binding free trade agreement modeled on NAFTA inside APEC. 
It managed to secure the Bogor Declaration in 1994 committing members to 
trade liberalization, but the US failed to overcome Asian reluctance to make 
binding and politically risky liberalization commitments.(44) In 1997, APEC 
was a useless bystander during the Asian Financial Crisis. In the aftermath 
of these failures, APEC’s agenda has become diversified and diffuse. The 
lack of consensus within APEC, and the loss of East Asian confidence in the 
Washington Consensus policies of the IMF during the Asian Financial Crisis, 
shifted the focus of region building to the APT. Writing just before the Obama 
Administration began to push the TPP, Ralph Cossa noted that the US “prefers 
that pride of place go to pan-Pacific institution building, … Clearly APEC and 
ARF should have priority over … pan-Asian community building.” However, 
he reckoned that, “the APT appears destined to be the primary vehicle for 
community building, … Perhaps it is time for the United States to take the next 
step in demonstrating its commitment to regional prosperity and stability… [by] 
underscoring its support for Asian community building.(45)
(2) The Failure of Japan’s Vision of Regionalism
Japan had a competing vision of Asia-Pacific regionalism based on the so-
called flying geese model of East Asian development.(46) It called for Japanese-
led policy coordination among East Asian governments to design orderly export-
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oriented growth strategies targeting the US market. The US hegemonic system 
provided East Asia with security, technology, capital, and a market for East 
Asian exports. The East Asian nations led by Japan would coordinate trade, 
investment, aid, and technology transfer so that industrial production would 
be relocated within East Asia as countries developed and their comparative 
advantage changed. Thus, as Japan (the lead goose) developed new industries 
it would send older industries to Taiwan or Korea (geese flying in the second 
rank). Taiwan and Korea would gain new industries and export their older 
industries to ASEAN countries and China who were geese flying further back 
in formation. This vision entailed managed trade rather than free trade and 
informed Japan’s attempts to lead in regional forums. For different reasons 
China and the US objected to this vision. And the development of complex intra-
regional production networks that efficiently exploited changing comparative 
advantage without this kind of management system undermined this vision.(47) 
The last serious attempt Japan made to implement this vision occurred during 
the Asian Financial Crisis when it proposed to set up an Asian Monetary Fund 
to rescue the region and provide an alternative to dependence on the IMF, but its 
initiative met the resistance of the US and China.(48) 
(3) The Absence of Chinese Leadership
China has not put forth a clear vision of East Asian regional order relating 
internal and external actors across functional areas. Rather, its approach has 
been to focus primarily on the ASEAN Plus One process with China, especially 
the China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (CAFTA) through trade liberalization, 
the construction of trade infrastructure links, technical aid, and the increasing 
use of the RMB in trade. The next broader East Asian focus has been APT.(49) 
China does not show much enthusiasm for larger regional frameworks such as 
APEC or the EAS, though it voices support for ASEAN initiative in building 
regionalism.(50) As for leadership style, China is not providing public goods to 
attract neighbors’ allegiance. Rather, it is using access to its growing economy 
and its growing military power to create leverage in discussions with individual 
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neighbors. 
5. At a Crossroads: The Coming Irrelevance of ASEAN-Plus?
As China challenges the strategic status quo, the long subordinated balance 
of power logic is rising up. Thus, East Asia is approaching a crossroads: will it 
continue to travel down the path of economic integration guided by APT, or will 
balance of power politics cripple this process? 
As mentioned above, China’s more assertive actions since 2009 have 
led its neighbors to believe that China may become a military and economic 
security threat. In particular, China presented the “9-dashed line” map to claim 
sovereignty over the entire South China Sea in 2009 despite its violation of 
the principles inherent in, and the rights granted to littoral states by, the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. Moreover, China has used fishing, coast 
guard, and energy development activity to contest existing administrative control 
in disputed maritime territories and strategically sensitive areas in the Yellow, 
East, and South China Seas. It has stopped abiding by its commitment in the 
China-ASEAN DOC in the South China Sea to discuss problems multilaterally. 
Only very recently has it returned to multilateral discussions with ASEAN after 
suffering diplomatic setbacks, particularly at the 2011 East Asian Summit when 
outside powers (e.g., the US) were included in discussions of these disputes 
over Chinese objections. This behavior has affected the fundamental nature 
of China’s relations with its maritime neighbors, as well as with the US Navy, 
which guards freedom of navigation and claims the right of innocent passage for 
its warships in East Asian waters. 
However, as mentioned above, East Asian regionalism is adapted to this 
kind of strategic environment. Its informality, shallowness, and flexibility have 
an advantage: they permit continuity of cooperation processes despite political 
tension and outbreaks of conflict between members that would wreck highly 
obligated, legalistic, rule-enforcing organizations. Continuity of the ASEAN-
Plus informal dialog process is important because it permits neutral parties 
to continue cooperation and to take an interest in brokering settlement. The 
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process reminds all that everyone loses trade and growth when conflict breaks 
out, including the conflict parties. In addition, conflict parties will lose trust 
and political influence among third parties who suffer economic losses as a 
consequence of conflict. 
(1) The Trans-Pacific Partnership Initiative and Rising Strategic Rivalry
The APT process would be very difficult to stop because it is flexible and 
the need for confidence building and continuing development in East Asia is so 
great. But it could be sidetracked by something that serves these same ends more 
attractively. The most likely threat in this regard is the Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(TPP) Agreement being led by the US. The TPP revives the old (and failed) US 
vision for APEC. The US wanted, and still wants, a “high-quality” free trade 
agreement that subsumes East Asia in a larger legally binding trans-pacific 
framework. The TPP agenda goes well beyond trade to include new kinds of 
intellectual property and investment protections. 
What gives the US new hope for this trans-pacific agenda is that it may 
now be able to get around the objections of other big powers. It excludes China, 
which for reasons of political and economic fragility discussed above would 
never agree to the radical new liberalization measures in the TPP. As for Japan, 
last year at the Hawaii APEC meeting Japanese Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda 
stated that Japan would negotiate to join the TPP. If Japan joins TPP, then South 
Korea would have an incentive to join TPP. South Korea ratified an FTA with 
the US in 2011 but it still lacks an FTA with Japan and other members. 
ASEAN may not like the idea of giving up the centrality of the ASEAN-
Plus process, nor would it like the NAFTA-like rules of the TPP, but joining 
TPP will not require quitting APT, and ASEAN members will decide on an 
individual basis whether or not the TPP is worth pursuing. For members who felt 
threatened by China, TPP might be worth joining if it made US protection more 
likely. 
A consolidated TPP with Japan, Korea, and East Asian developing countries 
as members would give these countries better access to the US market than 
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China would have. China would remain an attractive growing market and 
strong exporter, but some intermediate trade and investment currently flowing 
to factories in China could be redirected to TPP members better able to export 
directly to the US. These members would likely welcome this change. A robust 
TPP could also make it easier for the US to target China with trade sanctions 
over, for example, an undervalued exchange rate or predatory trade practices. 
Thus, China’s position as the focus of East Asian production networks producing 
finished goods for the US and the EU could be weakened. 
(2) TPP and the Security Environment in East Asia
TPP would not end the pursuit of comparative advantage in the region. US 
initiative would simply reconfigure it aided by the unease caused by China. As 
discussed above, a security community provides the strongest foundation for 
economic regionalism, and division caused by the security dilemma will destroy 
it. In 2011 the US renewed its commitment to a strong military presence and 
freedom of navigation in East Asia. In effect, the US offers a security community 
as the basis for regional economic integration, as well as insurance against a 
belligerent China. The US provision of security only distracts from East Asian 
regionalism if neighbors see China as a threat. However, they now do. So, as a 
provider of security on top of enhanced export opportunities, the US through 
TPP may draw energy and attention away from APT. Smaller countries do not 
have to make a choice between TPP and APT, but they will have to decide how 
to prioritize these initiatives. 
In sum, the new relationship between the balance of power and comparative 
advantage that emerged in 2011 will not kill regionalism, but it has the potential 
to redirect its path onto a trans-pacific axis as countries seek a US counterweight 
to an assertive China.
(3) The Japan Factor in 2012
If Japan gives priority to the TPP over APT, then the APT process would 
almost certainly become secondary in the region. Japan is a key US ally, so this 
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is not hard to imagine happening. However, the declining economic prospects of 
the West also have to be weighed by Japan. After a formal study commissioned 
by the Northeast Asian Summit in 2009 strongly recommended in December 
2011 going ahead with a Northeast Asian FTA, the Northeast Asian summit 
is expected to approve a formal effort to negotiate a Northeast Asian FTA 
including China, Japan, and South Korea in May 2012. The potential trade and 
growth gains for all from this are substantial, and the subsequent step would be 
the consolidation of an East Asian FTA including the ASEAN countries. This 
would be a timely boost to growth prospects. 
Thus, Japan will be straddling two critically important trade negotiations 
in 2012. Whichever way it throws its weight will likely determine the future 
course of regionalism. It would prefer not to have to choose because China it is 
Japan’s biggest trade partner, while the US its next biggest, but the sharpening 
strategic rivalry between the US and China might make it a difficult balancing 
act. However, Japan also has leverage in this situation and can influence the final 
form these agreements could take. 
III. Western Financial Crises Reinforcing East Asian Regionalism
1. Anatomy of the Euro Crisis
First, the Wall Street generated financial crisis of 2008-09 almost destroyed 
the global financial system, and though the catastrophe was avoided, one cannot 
say the US has recovered. Household and government debt has increased, 
and the need to repair balance sheets inhibits future lending and consumption 
growth. 
Then in 2010-2011, the Euro zone financial system teetered on the brink 
of collapse. It began with the 110 billion Euro bailout of Greece in May 2010. 
This was followed by the 67.5 billion Euro bailout of the Irish government in 
November 2010. In May 2011 Portugal got a 78 billion Euro bailout. Europe’s 
crisis came to a head in July 2011 with the second Greek debt crisis that required 
an additional 109 billion Euro bailout. The Greek government’s payments 
obligations—to lenders and to Greek citizens—was still unsustainable after 
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a year and a half of adjustment. So in February 2012 Greece was given an 
additional 21 billion Euro loan. 
As in previous sovereign debt crises, in Europe panicked lenders demanded 
painful cuts in government social welfare spending, or they would demand 
repayment of maturing loans and cease new lending. Greece’s democratic 
government has faced a dilemma as it searched for ways to cut its payments 
obligations: Greek voters refused to agree to all the cuts in social welfare 
spending that lenders were demanding, and lenders refused to ease Greece’s 
loan repayment obligations. This left Greece unable to make the loan payments 
coming due. 
To avoid government default, as was customary in these cases, the EU 
stepped with official funds to temporarily bridge the funding gap to buy time 
and broker an agreement. However, in 2011 the Greek funding gap was too 
large for the EU to handle. Without spending cuts and loan forgiveness, Greece 
would have to default and/or leave the Euro. The consequences would be 
dire for European banks, other highly indebted Euro zone countries, the Euro 
currency, and the EU itself. A compromise was reached, but more risk-averse 
lenders began presenting demands to Italy, Belgium, Spain, and France. These 
governments face rising borrowing costs and existing public spending and debt 
repayment obligations that may outweigh their revenue prospects, and they face 
the same political dilemmas with voters and creditors with insufficient EU funds 
to provide a bailout. 
Stopgap measures have put off the day of reckoning in the Euro zone but 
today, the fundamental issues remains unresolved. The required spending cuts 
and tax rises needed to ensure solvency will depress growth. This reduces 
revenue prospects, making the need to borrow persistent. Thus, beyond the short 
term, the outlook for Europe is not very good, though on a day-to-day basis 
things today may appear normal. 
(1) Doubt about the EU Model of Integration
This story can be traced back to the creation of the Euro as a currency 
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to replace EU member national currencies, and it serves as a warning to East 
Asia not to follow the same path. In brief, a single common currency replaced 
national currencies. National governments lost the power to set monetary policy 
and gave it to the European Central Bank (ECB), which set monetary policy in 
the entire Euro zone to optimize conditions at the productive core of Europe’s 
economy, i.e., Germany. But the fiscal organization of Europe remained 
autonomous and decentralized at the nation-state level, and levels of economic 
activity and development were quite varied from country to county within the 
wide Euro zone.
The benefits of a single currency were well advertised —elimination of 
currency exchange rate risk, and the reduction of currency conversion costs 
in cross border trade and investment transactions, and the full integration of 
a continental market. And the benefit of an ECB-run monetary policy keyed 
to the highly advanced and fiscally conservative German economy was low 
inflation and lower borrowing costs for everyone using the Euro. However, the 
problem of preserving national fiscal sovereignty in the wider context was not 
understood. 
The problem is that democratic governments have to shape fiscal policy 
in accordance with local economic and political conditions. Countries in the 
Euro zone periphery tended to be less developed, with more labor-intensive 
production technologies and more powerful labor unions. As advanced 
manufacturing and finance companies based in the core took over peripheral 
markets, local jobs, profits, and tax revenues were lost. Yet peripheral countries 
were led to believe they would share in the Euro zone’s wealth gains after they 
joined the Euro zone. 
As growth slowed and unemployment rose, labor demanded that their 
national governments ease the pain of structural adjustment. This meant more 
social welfare spending. National governments were also expected to stimulate 
growth and jobs. But national governments in economically distressed areas 
could no longer adjust monetary or currency exchange rate policy to stimulate 
economic activity. The core, which enjoys prosperity and prefers low inflation, 
ICU75通し.indb   28 13/02/26   17:44
29
East Asian Regionalism at a Crossroads
sets euro zone monetary policy; monetary easing to boost jobs on the periphery 
is not permitted. And because peripheral governments can no longer use 
currency devaluation to restore competitiveness, the only tool they had left was 
fiscal stimulus, i.e., spending without raising taxes, because taxes would defeat 
the purpose of stimulus spending. 
National fiscal sovereignty in the Euro zone meant two more things. First, 
there was no federal Euro government to tax wealth accumulating at the core to 
finance peripheral states. Second, governments could borrow as much as banks 
were willing to lend. So distressed states borrowed to finance greater spending. 
And banks were willing to lend freely at low cost because they believed the 
Euro core (in effect, Germany) would bail out these governments if they got too 
deeply into debt. 
As banks and distressed governments acted out this scenario, collectively, 
the debts accumulated by these countries have become so big that the whole 
Euro zone enterprise as presently constituted has become untenable. After the 
incompatibility of national fiscal sovereignty with the Euro became clear, the 
Euro zone began to contemplate eliminating national fiscal sovereignty. But 
this idea is not politically consistent with European social democracy and once 
voters understand what this step would mean, they will reject it. And it will 
probably not change the dismal sovereign debt outlook.
In the meantime, Europe is looking to Asia for a short-term bailout. Yet 
there is something unseemly in asking a country like China, where the 2010 
per capita income was $4,260, to bail out Greece or Italy where the per capita 
incomes in 2010 were around $30,000 and $35,000 respectively. 
2. Lessons for East Asia?
The story of the Euro crisis contains certain negative lessons for East Asia. 
Above all, East Asia will avoid a single currency. That is because, to avoid the 
problems discussed above, East Asian states will not hand monetary and fiscal 
sovereignty over to an East Asian central bank or federal government. 
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(1) Global Economic Structure
Western consumption has underwritten the East Asian strategy of export-
led industrialization. But after the financial crises of Wall Street in 2008 and the 
Euro zone of 2011, and with the rise of the East Asian share of global GDP (to 
around 30 percent), a new relationship is needed. East Asia can no longer rely 
on exporting goods to North America and Europe to drive growth because the 
outlook for western income and consumption growth is poor, and East Asian 
production and export capacity has grown too large. Shifting toward a domestic 
consumption led growth model is a key agenda item for East Asia —China most 
of all. Here, the key will be shifting China’s growth dependence away from 
exports toward domestic consumption. This creates a new agenda of policy 
coordination as China attempts to manage this delicate process in coordination 
with regional economic partners. 
(2) Global Monetary and Financial Arrangements
The IMF proved itself unable or unwilling to effectively manage currency 
stability in East Asia in 1997 and so the APT process devised the Chiang Mai 
Initiative. The 2008 Wall Street crisis pushed APT to expand this bilateral 
currency swap arrangement into a shared currency pool under the Chiang Mai 
Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM).(51) The IMF in the midst of the Euro 
crisis today remains preoccupied with saving the EU. It gives less attention 
to sustaining growth in the developing world than most East Asian states 
would like. After these disappointing turns, East Asia wants a change in the 
management of the global monetary and financial system and it is more willing 
to contemplate regional solutions to insulate it from instability in the US and the 
EU.(52)
Another issue is that structural trade deficits and financial weakness in 
NAFTA and the EU are putting upward pressure on the RMB and Japanese 
yen, and at the same time, are devaluing the dollars and Euros being held 
in central bank reserves. And the use of US and euro financial systems to 
implement economic sanctions on countries that are key resource suppliers 
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to East Asia gives the region an incentive to create alternative currency 
payments mechanisms. This is prompting China to expand use of the RMB as 
international money with major trade partners, and today 11 percent or more 
of its trade is transacted in RMB. With up to 60 percent of its trade with China 
still denominated in dollars, Japan is now looking to transact more of this trade 
in direct currency exchange. The Asian Development Bank, in association 
with APT, is focusing on the possible use of an Asian Currency Unit to reduce 
dependence on external currencies in intra-regional trade, and reduce exchange 
rate risk and transaction costs.(53) The value of the ACU would be determined 
by a basket of regional currencies, and could be used to settle intra-regional 
payments transactions, or at least be used as a technical indicator to facilitate 
monetary policy coordination. But the problems revealed by the euro-crisis 
warns against the single currency solution. 
It seems odd that East Asia, where the bulk of global saving occurs, and 
where the potential for productive investment is greatest, still relies heavily on 
western financial markets to direct East Asian savings into investment in the 
region. Hence, APT, supported by the Asian Development Bank, has sponsored 
the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI) since 2003 and in other ways seeks 
ways to develop regional financial markets.(54)
(3) Global Economic Governance
The G-20 widens participation in global economic governance at the 
discursive level. East Asian members in the G-20 are China, Japan, South 
Korea, and Indonesia. They do not articulate an agreed East Asian perspective in 
this forum as Europe can through the G-20 seat occupied by the EU. However, 
they share East Asia’s position in the global economic structure (as the largest 
originator of trans-regional exports, the largest source of global savings, and the 
center of global growth), and so they must figure out how to use their presence 
in the G-20 to advance their collective interest in this setting. In particular, 
the G-20 agenda has been preoccupied with saving the EU, but observers in 
East Asia are conscious of the opportunity cost of spending money to bail out 
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EU members that could be used to finance badly needed and highly profitable 
investments in East Asian growth.(55)
IV. Conclusion
East Asian regionalism is at a crossroads in 2012 due to two key 
developments. One is that China’s assertiveness is cracking East Asian solidarity 
and pushing some East Asian countries toward more engagement with the US 
pivot to the detriment of the APT process. However, fragile economic conditions 
in the US and Europe give East Asia incentives to reduce dependence on the 
US and build East Asian cooperation. How this tension will be resolved is hard 
to predict. The assertiveness of China (if it persists), and how Japan prioritizes 
the Northeast Asian FTA and TPP negotiations, will be important factors in 
determining which path the region will take. 
The other big development is the Euro crisis, and the problems of global 
economic governance highlighted by this crisis. The consequences of the 
Euro zone’s radical surrender of national economic and financial sovereignty 
contain lessons that reinforce the current agenda of state-centered East Asian 
regionalism. In particular, East Asia will want to protect national economic 
sovereignty, and pursue a broad agenda of development cooperation. It will step 
up monetary and currency cooperation to seek alternatives to the weakening 
dollar and the euro to serve international money functions within the region, 
though not aiming for a single Asian currency as it might have done before the 
Euro crisis. And it will look more urgently to develop regional financial markets. 
Due to failing growth in the West, East Asia will have to look more seriously 
at an East Asian FTA and ways to shift toward a more consumption driven 
economy in China in order to improve long-term regional growth prospects; 
and East Asia will begin to articulate a desire to change the discursive and 
institutional aspects of global economic governance.
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<Summary>
David Arase
This paper deals with two questions. One is how the competing logics of 
the balance of power vs. comparative advantage will determine the course of 
East Asian regionalism. This discussion suggests that the new regional security 
agenda accompanying China’s recent policy choices, combined with fresh US 
attention to the region, have the potential to change the course of regionalism 
from an East Asian focus to a trans-pacific focus. The other question is how 
the Euro crisis may affect the course of East Asian regionalism. It is suggested 
that the Euro crisis contains many negative lessons that, unlike the new 
Asian security agenda, will tend to reinforce the current model of East Asian 
regionalism.
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